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AuI its Trade Policy Statement of April 2011, the Austral- Government committed to “preserve the right ofstralian governments to make laws in important
public policy areas” and to reject provisions in trade
agreements that could “limit its capacity to put health
warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco
products or its ability to continue the Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme”.1 One forum in which this resolve is
likely to be tested is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agree-
ment (TPPA) negotiations. The TPPA is a proposed
regional free trade agreement between Australia, Brunei,
Chile, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, New Zealand, the United
States and Vietnam — a diverse assortment of countries
from several continents around the Pacific rim. The TPPA
differs from existing bilateral and regional free trade agree-
ments in its sheer size and geographic diversity. It has the
potential to restrict national policy space — “the freedom,
scope and mechanisms that governments have to choose,
design and implement public policies to fulfil their aims”2
— on an unprecedented scale.
This article explores the potential for the TPPA to
constrain Australia’s national health policy space through
two illustrative case studies: tobacco plain packaging and
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).
Investor–state dispute settlement and plain 
packaging of tobacco products
During 2011, the Australian Government introduced legis-
lation requiring tobacco products to be packaged in plain
paper (with graphic health warnings, but minimal brand-
ing). This represents an important assault on one of the
last bastions of tobacco marketing — the appeal to per-
sonal identity.3 Strong tobacco control policies such as
ging laws are consistent
ientific literature and the
ramework Convention on
e challenged under inter-
t agreements, which are
public health goals.
 a subsidiary of Philip
as launched an investor–
lian Government over its
tobacco plain packaging legislation. While several tobacco
companies have taken their complaints to the High Court,
PMA has also been able to pursue its case in international
arbitration (where it has a greater chance of success)
through an investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) clause
in a bilateral investment treaty signed between Australia
and Hong Kong in the early 1990s. This is the second
investor–state dispute to arise over tobacco labelling; PMI
is bringing a similar case against Uruguay through a Swiss
subsidiary.4 PMI has also been prominent in calling for an
ISDS provision in the TPPA.4,5
Ironically, the corporate restructuring that has allowed
PMI to access the Hong Kong bilateral investment treaty
(PMA was made the sole shareholder in Philip Morris
Australia in February 2011) has also significantly weak-
ened its claims. This is because the investment was made
with the company’s full knowledge that the plain pack-
aging legislation was being developed.6 The government
has a strong case. Nevertheless, the dispute with PMA
highlights broader problems of including ISDS provisions
in trade treaties, and demonstrates why it is important that
they be excluded from the TPPA.
The arbitration rules that govern PMA’s dispute with the
Australian Government are those of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. The case will be
decided by a tribunal made up of three members: one
chosen by PMA, one chosen by Australia, and a third,
mutually agreed upon, which will act as president. This
method of appointing arbitrators has been described as
neither independent nor impartial.7 In sharp contrast to
domestic forms of adjudication, individuals can serve as a
legal representative in one ISDS case and an arbitrator in
another, further undermining their ability to act without
bias. Furthermore, although the arbitrators will be experts
in international investment law, they may have little or no
experience with specific fields of public policy such as
tobacco control.
While the public has a stake in investor–state disputes,
confidentiality is a dominant principle in investment arbitra-
tion. Hearings are rarely opened to the public unless both
parties agree, and investors have opted for closed hearings
in several recent cases concerning public policy. In this
regard, it is commendable that the Australian Government
has adopted a high standard of transparency in advance of
the commencement of formal proceedings by posting
PMA’s claims and their response on a public website.8
The arbitration will be expensive for Australian taxpay-
ers, although the government may be able to recoup somee first · 29 February 2012
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to date, legal fees alone have amounted to over US$4
million and in one case have exceeded US$13 million.9
There are also arbitrator’s fees, administration fees and
additional costs for involving experts and witnesses. Even
more significant are the awards in investor–state cases,
which are widely enforceable.7 The Czech Republic was
obliged to pay more than US$350 million in compensation
to a Dutch investor, which according to one report meant a
near doubling of the country’s public sector deficit.10
It can readily be seen how insertion of a TPPA ISDS
mechanism into Australia’s national health policy space
might skew legislation away from the public interest
towards supranational corporate interests. This is why it is
significant that the government has vowed to no longer
include provisions on ISDS in the bilateral and regional
trade agreements that it signs.1
Australia’s refusal to consent to ISDS in the TPPA is a
significant step towards limiting the encroachment of
international trade agreements into our national health
policy space and retaining our sovereign right to regulate
significant areas of public health policy.
US proposals for medicines policy in the TPPA
Challenges to Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee processes
The PBS is another area of domestic health policy that the
Australian Government has committed to protect in inter-
national trade agreements. However, US TPPA negotiators
are seeking substantial changes to Australia’s laws and
administrative processes. Certain draft TPPA provisions
relate to the PBS directly and also indirectly, by seeking to
prolong pharmaceutical patents and minimise exceptions
to them made in the public interest. We examine these
proposals as another instance of how the TPPA may
promote incursions into our national health policy space.
In October 2011, a draft annex to the transparency chap-
ter of the TPPA was leaked.11 Under the rubric of transpar-
ency and procedural fairness, this TPPA annex seeks to
impose new restrictions on the operation of national phar-
maceutical reimbursement and pricing schemes (Box 1). It is
an annex because it is not designed to apply to the US, as it
would if it was in the body of the treaty.
Clause (d) of paragraph X.3 of the draft annex would
require countries to reimburse pharmaceutical companies
based on “competitive market-derived prices in the Party’s
territory”, or other benchmarks that “appropriately recog-
nize the value” of the patented product. This wording
represents a shift away from the more science-based
standard in Annex 2-C of the Australia–United States Free
Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), which refers to the “objec-
tively demonstrated therapeutic significance” of the new
patented pharmaceutical (http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aus-
fta/final-text). This provision includes no mechanism for
proving that prices are derived from “competitive” mar-
kets. It undermines the world-class science-based mecha-
nisms used by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory
Committee (PBAC) to determine whether a new patented
medicine has sufficient health innovation to be listed on
the PBS (based on a determination of cost-effectiveness, as
well as efficacy, quality and safety).
Paragraph X.3 of the draft annex seeks to impose a new
independent appeals process on determinations by gov-
ernment bodies such as the PBAC (Box 1). This is contrary
to what was decided (after prolonged and acrimonious
negotiations) under Annex 2-C of the AUSFTA, which
only provides for independent expert review as a quality
improvement exercise for the PBAC. The threat and the
use of an independent appeals process would increase the
capacity of the pharmaceutical industry to lobby against
PBAC decisions and undercut their expert-informed deter-
minations.
Paragraph X.4 of the draft annex requires parties to
permit pharmaceutical companies to disseminate informa-
tion to health professionals and consumers via the internet
— a practice that is not permitted for prescription drugs in
Australia due to concerns about overprescribing. This is
also contrary to Annex 2-C of the AUSFTA, which makes
the direct advertising of pharmaceuticals subject to Aus-
tralia’s domestic laws, regulations and procedures. There is
a consensus against such advertising in the Australian
national policy space, chiefly because of its capacity to
increase lobbying of the medical profession for purposes of
corporate gain rather than public health benefit.
While the effect of US TPPA proposals on Australia’s
PBS would be economically damaging and reduce the
affordability of medicines in Australia, the effects on access
to medicines in other TPPA countries could be far more
severe, particularly for developing countries and those
required to make greater changes to their domestic laws.12
Extending intellectual property rights
US TPPA proposals on intellectual property applying to
patents13,14 (Box 2) would also add to the cost of medicines
overall, affecting the sustainability of the PBS. Non-
government organisations have undertaken extensive
analyses of these proposed provisions,12,15 and have shown
areas where TPPA provisions extend patent protection
1 Leaked United States demands for changes to schemes 
such as Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
• Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC)
recommendations to be based on competitively derived 
market forces or systems that appropriately value 
patented pharmaceuticals (no mention of “objectively 
derived therapeutic significance” as in the Australia–
United States Free Trade Agreement)
• Appeals process able to challenge PBAC 
recommendations
• Heightened capacity for direct-to-patient pharmaceutical 
advertising ◆
2 Some United States proposals for extensions to 
intellectual property rights applying to patents
• Patent protection for new forms of existing drugs
• Patenting of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods
• Elimination of pre-grant opposition
• Extensions to data-exclusivity periods for some drugs ◆2MJA Online first ·29 February 2012
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ing Australian law.15
For example, proposed article 8.1 of the intellectual
property (IP) chapter of the TPPA provides patent protec-
tion for new forms, uses or methods of using a known
product, whereas article 17.9.1 of the AUSFTA does not
require patent protection to be provided for new forms of
existing drugs.15 Although, in practice, new forms are
sometimes patented, the TPPA proposals would restrict
efforts to tighten patenting standards in future.
Proposed IP article 8.2 requires patenting of diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods, whereas article 17.9.2 of
the AUSFTA allows for its exclusion.15 This change could
restrict expeditious patient access to new clinical develop-
ments and substantially add to health care costs. Proposed
IP article 8.7 would also eliminate pre-grant opposition to
patent applications by third parties, a safeguard provided
for in the Australian Patents Act 1990, which is designed to
prevent unwarranted patents from being granted.15
Most concerning are the provisions for data exclusivity
periods — where generic manufacturers cannot use clini-
cal trial data to prepare and register their products for
springboarding after patent expiry. Proposed IP article
9.214 provides an additional 3 years of data exclusivity for
new uses of existing pharmaceutical products, on top of
the 5 years of data exclusivity already permitted under
article 17.10.1 of the AUSFTA. There is also a placeholder
for specific provisions for biologics (medicines produced
from biological products, which are not currently dealt
with separately in Australia). US pharmaceutical compa-
nies are reportedly lobbying for 12 years of data exclusivity
for biologics. If adopted, these proposals would lead to
higher costs to the PBS (as drugs stay under patent for
longer periods) and delayed entry of cheaper generic
medicines into the market.
The US TPPA proposals for extended intellectual prop-
erty rights and data exclusivity for pharmaceutical compa-
nies would require changes to Australian laws and
administrative processes. They would also conflict with the
spirit of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Rais-
ing the Bar) Bill 2011, which is currently before the Senate
and seeks to raise patent standards and facilitate faster
regulatory approval for generic medicines.
Conclusion
Recent Australian trade policy commitments to exclude
ISDS and provisions that would affect the PBS from the
TPPA are a positive step towards preserving sovereign,
democratic and science-based control over our national
health policy space. It is important that Australia continues
to insist that future trade agreements, including the TPPA,
do not extend the intellectual property privileges of patent
holders, interfere with the operation of the PBS or provide
foreign corporations with ISDS rights to challenge domes-
tic public health policies.
Competing interests: Thomas Faunce has received Discovery Grants on the AUSFTA, on 
the PBS, and on fraud in the pharmaceutical industry from the Australian Research 
Council (ARC). The ARC was not involved in writing this artilce.
Provenance: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
1 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Gillard 
Government Trade Policy Statement: trading our way to more jobs and 
prosperity. Canberra: DFAT, 2011. http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/
trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.pdf (accessed Dec 2011).
2 Koivusalo M, Schrecker T, Labonte R. Globalization and policy space for health 
and social determinants of health. In: Labonte R, Schrecker T, Packer C, 
Runnels V, editors. Globalization and health: pathways, evidence and policy. 
New York: Routledge, 2009: 105-130.
3 Chapman S. Why the tobacco industry fears plain packaging. Med J Aust 2011; 
195: 255. 
4 Porterfield MC, Byrnes CR. Philip Morris v Uruguay: will investor–state 
arbitration send restrictions on tobacco marketing up in smoke? Investment 
Treaty News 2011; 1 (4): 3-5. http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/iisd_itn_july_2011_
en.pdf (accessed Dec 2011).
5 Faunce TA, Townsend R. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: challenges 
for Australian health and medicine policies. Med J Aust 2011; 194: 83-86. 
6 Voon T, Mitchell A. Time to quit? Assessing international investment claims 
against plain tobacco packaging in Australia. J Int Econ Law 2011; 14: 515-552.
7 Van Harten G. Investment treaty arbitration and public law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007.
8 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department. Investor–state 
arbitration — tobacco plain packaging. http://www.ag.gov.au/
Internationallaw/Pages/Investor-State-Arbitration---Tobacco-Plain-
Packaging.aspx (accessed Feb 2012).
9 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Latest developments 
in investor–state dispute settlement. IIA Issues Note No. 1, March 2011. http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20113_en.pdf (accessed Dec 2011).
10 International Institute for Sustainable Development. A parliamentarian’s 
guide to international investment agreements and their implications for 
domestic policy-making. Winnipeg: IISD, 2007.
11 Trans-Pacific Partnership. Transparency chapter: annex on transparency 
and procedural fairness for healthcare technologies, June 22, 2011. http://
www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/
TransPacificTransparency.pdf (accessed Dec 2011).
12 Flynn S, Kaminski M, Baker B, Koo J. Public interest analysis of the US TPP 
proposal for an IP chapter. Draft version 1.2, November 16, 2011. Washington: 
American University Washington College of Law, 2011. http://infojustice.org/
tpp-analysis-november2011 (accessed Dec 2011).
13 Trans-Pacific Partnership. Intellectual property rights chapter: draft — 
February 10, 2011. http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-
text-ipr-chapter.pdf (accessed Dec 2011).
14 Trans-Pacific Partnership. Intellectual property rights chapter (selected 
Provisions), September 2011. http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf (accessed Dec 2011).
15 Public Citizen. Dangers for access to medicines in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement: comparative analysis of the US intellectual property proposal and 
Australian law. http://www.citizen.org/documents/Australia-TPPA-chart.pdf 
(accessed Dec 2011). ❏e first · 29 February 2012
